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TWO MODELS OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENTt 
Craig M. Bradley* 
The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of 
contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the "Brethren" in 
such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them 
more profoundly stuck. In 1971 Justice Harlan called for "an over-
hauling" of fourth amendment law, 1 but this has not occurred. In-
stead, the Court has simply continued to struggle with the same 
problems, finding "solutions" which sow ever more litigation and con-
fusion. More than a decade ago, Professor Weinreb cited the fact that 
in the preceding five Terms (1968-69 to 1972-73) the Court had ren-
dered sixteen major opinions interpreting the fourth amendment, illus-
trating that the "body of [fourth amendment] doctrine . . . is unstable 
and unconvincing."2 In the past five Terms (1979-80 to 1983-84) the 
Court has decided thirty-five cases involving the fourth amendment. 
In seven of these there was no majority opinion. In the seventeen 
cases decided in the last two years, the Supreme Court has never 
reached the same result as all lower courts and has usually reversed 
the highest court below, rendering a total of sixty-one separate opin-
ions in the process. Thus it is apparent that not only do the police not 
understand fourth amendment law, but that even the courts, after 
briefing, argument, and calm reflection, cannot agree as to what police 
behavior is appropriate in a particular case. 3 What policeman ( or 
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, 
and Alex Tanford for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
* Charles L. Whistler Professor of µw, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law. 
A.B. 1967, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1970, University of Virginia. - Ed. 
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J,, concurring in the 
judgment). 
2. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 47, 49 (1974). 
3. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's discussion of what had gone on in the court 
below in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982): 
Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the view that Sanders 
prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch but not the search of the paper bag. 
Judge Robb agreed that this result was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his 
opinion "the right to search an automobile should include the right to open any container 
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested prisoner carries 
with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and any envelope found in his pocket, 
and the right to search a room includes authority to open and search all the drawers and 
containers found within the room." ••. 655 F.2d at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred 
with Judge Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper bag. 
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judge or law professor) could say confidently what the proper scope of 
a search incident to arrest is, 4 or how far the authorities may go in 
detaining a suspected drug smuggler at an airport? 
Professor LaFave recently engaged in the game, so dear and famil-
iar to fourth amendment scholars, of demonstrating that the nine _ 
search and seizure decisions rendered in the 1982-83 Term were illogi-
cal, inconsistent with prior holdings and, generally, hopelessly confus-
ing. 5 While opinions that lend themselves to this sort of demolition 
are wonderful grist for law professors' mills, they do little to advance 
the purposes of the amendment: "to safeguard citizens from rash and 
unreasonable interferences with privacy"6 by giving the police clear-
cut rules to follow.7 The Court's failure to provide such rules leads 
not only to the exclusion of evidence in cases involving the guilty, but 
also to intrusions upon the rights of both the innocent and the guilty 
by police who, faced with incomprehensibly complex rules either ig-
nore them or, in their efforts to follow them, make mistakes which 
lead to evidentiary exclusion. 
Contributing to the Court's difficulties in this area is the exclusion-
ary rule, but it is not solely to blame. Until the establishment of the 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule last Term, 8 the rule's 
operation was simple: if evidence was unconstitutionally obtained it 
was (always) inadmissible in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.9 There 
Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who dissented on the ground 
that Sanders should not be applied retroactively. 
456 U.S. 798, 803 n.3 (1982) (citation omitted). Amazingly, this disagreement was just among 
the dissenting judges, whose views obviously differed from that of the majority as well. 
4. For example, see Professor Kamisar's discussion of the unanswered questions raised by 
the search incident to arrest case of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in J. CHOPER, Y. 
KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-81, at 90-
100 (1982). 
5. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, 
Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983). 
6. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
7. In three recent opinions the Court has emphasized the overriding necessity of providing 
clear rules for the police to follow in fourth amendment cases. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 
1735, 1742-43 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981). 
8. Last Term, in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), the Court created a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule 
in cases where the police have acted in reasonable reliance on a warrant, thus opening up a new 
area for litigation and confusion. See Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable 
Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J., in press. 
9. Well, almost always. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (evidence admissible 
even though seized pursuant to an arrest under city ordinance later found unconstitutional), for a 
minor exception to this rule. See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence 
illegally seized by police and therefore inadmissible in state criminal proceeding is nevertheless 
admissible in collateral federal civil suit); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand 
jury witness may not refuse to answer question even though it is based on evidence obtained from 
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was no confusion surrounding the operation of the rule. The only dif-
ficulty arose in the first step of the exclusionary process - determin-
ing whether the evidence was constitutionally obtained. However, the 
fact that a negative conclusion on this question led to the unpalatable 
result of excluding valid (and frequently vital) evidence against a per-
son who was probably a criminal undoubtedly influenced this determi-
nation.10 As will be demonstrated, the Court is loathe to declare 
searches unconstitutional, with the concomitant evidentiary exclusion, 
in cases where the police have essentially acted reasonably, even if they 
have not exactly conformed to existing Supreme Court doctrine. The 
result is that the Court strives to justify such police behavior by 
stretching existing doctrine to accommodate it. Herein lies the inher-
ent contradiction, and source of confusion, in fourth amendment law: 
The Court tries on the one hand to lay down clear rules for the police 
to follow in every situation while also trying to respond flexibly, or 
"reasonably," to each case because a hard-line approach would lead to 
exclusion of evidence. Since the rules are not clear and since, even if 
they were, it is virtually impossible to lay down a rule that anticipates 
all potential cases, the police engage in behavior that does not conform 
to the rules but that strikes the Court as having been essentially rea-
sonable. Given the Court's predilection for clear-cut rules, however, 
simply declaring such conduct "reasonable" and leaving it at that is 
not enough. Instead, the Court offers a detailed explanation as to how 
the police behavior really did conform to the old rule (and in so doing, 
changes the contours of the old rule), or creates a new rule to justify 
the behavior. Naturally, such a holding spawns new litigation, which 
leads to a new opinion, which leads to a new rule, etc. 11 
Fourth amendment critics rank in rows, and it has been repeatedly 
pointed out that individual cases are inconsistent with each other or 
that whole chunks of doctrine, such as the automobile exception or the 
plain view exception, are either misconceived, too broad, or too nar-
row. But these critics all play the Court on its own field, simply argu-
ing as tenth Justices that the doctrines should be tinkered with in 
different ways than the Court has done. This Article, in contrast, sug-
him in an unconstitutional search); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (unconstitution-
ally seized evidence is admissible at trial for impeachment purposes). 
10. It has previously been observed that any meaningful sanction for violation of the rules 
governing searches will tend to create pressure to relax the rules. Paulsen, The Exclusionary 
Rule and Misconduct by the Police in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 88 (C. 
Sowle ed. 1962). 
11. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (later over-
ruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)), expressed his fear that the holding in that 
case would lead to a "new stream of litigation." 453 U.S. at 436. 
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gests that current fourth amendment law, complete with the constant 
tinkering which it necessarily entails, should be abandoned altogether. 
Instead, there are two, and only two, ways of looking at the fourth 
amendment which will provide the police with reasonably coherent 
direction as to how they must proceed and the courts with a consistent 
basis for decision. 
The two models, briefly, may be called the "no lines" and the 
"bright line" approaches. Model I, no lines, uses tort law as a guide12 
in proposing that the hopeless quest of establishing detailed guidelines 
for police behavior in every possible situation be abandoned. It sug-
gests that the Court adopt the following view of the fourth amend-
ment: A search or seizure must be reasonable, considering all relevant 
factors on a case-by-case basis. If it is not, the evidence must be ex-
cluded.13 Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, 
whether probable cause existed, whether a warrant was obtained, 
whether exigent circumstances existed, the nature of the intrusion, the 
quantum of evidence possessed by the police, 14 and the seriousness of 
the offense under investigation. This model enjoys support from the 
history of the fourth amendment15 and is (roughly) the current prac-
tice in Germany and other European countries.16 Moreover, in most 
cases it reflects the result, though not the reasoning, of current 
Supreme Court cases. 
The second model may be as shocking at first glance to "law and 
order" advocates as the first model is to civil libertarians. It is, basi-
cally, that the Supreme Court should actually enforce the warrant 
doctrine to which it has paid lip service for so many years. That is, a 
warrant is always required for every search and seizure when it is prac-
ticable to obtain one. However, in order that this requirement be 
workable and not be swallowed by its exception, the warrant need not 
be in writing but rather may be phoned or radioed into a magistrate 
(where it will be tape recorded and the recording preserved) who will 
authorize or forbid the search orally. By making the procedure for 
obtaining a warrant less difficult (while only marginally reducing the 
safeguards it provides), the number of cases where "emergencies" jus-
tify an exception to the warrant requirement should be very small. 
12. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text. 
13. Or whatever remedy is developed to replace the exclusionary rule must be applied. 
14. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 751 n.5 (1983) (concurring opinion of Stevens, J.), three 
Justices suggested that a greater intrusion might be justified if there were a "virtual certainty" 
that evidence was to be found in a particular place than if there were merely probable cause. 
15. See notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983). 
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These modelsI7 are the only two possibilities because they are the 
only two ways of dealing with fourth amendment problems that do not 
force the Court into the clear rule/flexible response dilemma. Model 
I, by presenting an unabashedly unclear rule that provides no guide-
lines, will never have to be modified to suit an unusual fact situation. 
While not an ideal solution, it will, it is argued, work considerably 
better than the present system where the Court purports to set forth 
clear rules but does not actually do so. Model II presents a clear rule 
which can be lived with. If the Court required a modified, easily ob-
tainable warrant to be used in all but true emergencies, the police 
would know what is expected of them and would be able to conform 
their conduct to the requirement of the law, much as they have accom-
modated their behavior to the Miranda requirements. Is Any other ap-
proach which tries to set forth rules which the Court is unwilling to 
enforce strictly will necessarily become mired in exceptions and modi-
fications (with resultant confusion) as has occurred in the current law. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
As indicated, the fundamental problem with fourth amendment 
law is that it is confusing. It fails to inform the police how to behave 
and to inform the lower courts of the basis for the exclusionary deci-
sion. This failure is the result of the Court's attempt to pursue a com-
promise between considering cases flexibly, on the grounds of the 
reasonableness of police behavior, and setting forth clear rules, which, 
if the police fail to follow them, will lead to evidentiary exclusion. The 
Court purports to set forth clear rules while actually adjusting them 
constantly to accommodate each new fact situation. Confusion in the 
law is not unique to the fourth amendment, of course, but it is a partic-
ularly serious problem in this area because the exclusionary remedy 
for fourth amendment violations does not make whole the criminal 
17. Readers familiar with the criminal procedure literature may be tempted to identify the 
two models described here with Packer's "Due Process Model" and "Crime Control Model" 
described in H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). This tempta-
tion should be resisted. Packer's models are descriptive of the two competing theoretical ex-
tremes which interact to form a criminal procedure doctrine that is somewhere in the middle. 
The two models suggested here are not models of ideological systems but rather are prescriptive 
of two possible means of actually dealing with fourth amendment problems. Despite a facial 
similarity between Model I and Packer's "Crime Control Model" and Model II and his "Due 
Process Model," the models suggested here are not extreme ideological positions. Rather, as will 
be argued, they are both intended to be ideologically as neutral as possible. The benefits of 
adopting either of these models would be the elimination of the confusion that currently pervades 
fourth amendment law, not an ideological victory for either law and order or civil liberties 
advocates. 
18. This rule would, however, have a greater impact on protection of individual rights than 
the "reading of the rights" provides under Miranda. 
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defendant whose rights have been violated - nothing can "unsearch" 
his house - and does nothing at all for an innocent victim of an illegal 
search, who derives no benefit from evidentiary exclusion. Thus, it is 
not a "remedy" in the ordinary sense. If police are confused about the 
law and therefore perform illegal searches, the prosecution suffers loss 
of evidence (in many cases, if the police had understood the law they 
could have conformed their conduct to it) and society suffers viola-
tions of the civil rights of its citizens. Moreover, unlike other areas of 
law, which can be contemplated at leisure by judges and lawyers, 
fourth amendment law is supposed to instruct police how to act in the 
heat of enforcement of the criminal laws. Consequently, in criminal 
procedure it is uniquely imperative that the police be informed of sim-
ple, straightforward principles by which to guide their behavior. 
At the heart of both the fourth amendment and the clear rule/ 
flexible response dichotomy is the warrant "requirement" - so often 
espoused and so rarely enforced by the Court. 19 Recently, in United 
States v. Ross, 20 the Court, quoting an earlier, unanimous opinion, re-
affirmed its commitment to the search warrant: 
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."21 
In fact, these exceptions are neither few nor well-delineated.22 
There are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant 
requirement or both. They include searches incident to arrest (excep-
tions to both);23 automobile searches ( exception to warrant require-
19. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1914) (affirming the antiquity of 
the warrant requirement). But see Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1927) (one 
example of how easily the Court could skirt the "requirement" when it wished). As Professor 
LaFave has noted: 
[T]he Supreme Court's assertion "that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain ad-
vance judicial approval of searches and seizure" must be taken with a grain of salt. The 
Court in fact has not been that demanding, but yet has failed to articulate clearly any basis 
for squaring the principle that warrants-when-practicable is the best policy with [its deci-
sions which recognize the various exceptions]. 
w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 4.l(a) (1978) (citation omitted). 
20. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
21. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
390 (1978) which was, in tum, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
22. Professor Haddad made a similar observation in 1977 before some of the newer excep-
tions had been created. Haddad, We/I-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold 
Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977). 
23. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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ment);24 border searches (both);25 searches near the border (warrant 
and sometimes both);26 administrative searches (probable cause excep-
tion);27 administrative searches of regulated businesses (warrant);28 
stop and frisk (both);29 plain view, open field seizures and prison 
"shakedowns" (both, because they are not covered by the fourth 
amendment at all);30 exigent circumstances (warrant);31 search of a 
person in custody (both);32 search incident to nonarrest when there is 
probable cause to arrest (both);33 fire investigations (warrant);34 war-
rantless entry following arrest elsewhere (warrant);35 boat boarding 
for document checks (both);36 consent searches (both);37 welfare 
searches (both, because not a "search");38 inventory searches (both);39 
driver's license and vehicle registration checks (both);40 airport 
searches (both);41 searches at courthouse doors (both);42 the new 
"school search" (both);43 and finally the standing doctrine which, 
while not strictly an exception to fourth amendment requirements, has 
that effect by causing the courts to ignore fourth amendment 
violations. 44 
24. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see also United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 
881 (1985) (extending Ross to a warrantless search, three days later, of packages taken from a 
vehicle). 
25. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). 
26. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (probable cause re-
quired for roving patrol searches for illegal aliens away from the border), with United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (probable cause not required for "fixed checkpoint" stops). 
27. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
28. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
29. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 
(1985) (extending Terry to cases where the police suspect a person, not of being armed or dan-
gerous or engaged in or about to commit a crime, but of having committed a felony in the past). 
30. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion) (plain view); 
Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (open field); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 
(1984) (prison shakedowns). 
31. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
32. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
33. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (while probable cause to amst is a prerequi-
site, probable cause to search is not). 
34. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). 
35. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). 
36. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
38. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
39. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
40. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
41. See United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). 
42. See Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972). 
43. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
44. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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As anyone who has worked in the criminal justice system knows, 
searches conducted pursuant to these exceptions, particularly searches 
incident to arrest, automobile and "stop and frisk" searches, far ex-
ceed searches performed pursuant to warrants. 45 The reason that all 
of these exceptions have grown up is simple: the clear rule that war-
rants are required is unworkable46 and to enforce it would lead to ex-
clusion of evidence in many cases where the police activity was 
essentially reasonable. 
By its continued adherence to the warrant requirement in theory, 
though not in fact, the Court has sown massive confusion among the 
police and lower courts.47 The automobile cases are paradigmatic of 
this trend. In Carroll v. United States, 48 the Court upheld a warrant-
less search of a car that prohibition agents had stopped with probable 
cause sixteen miles outside of Grand Rapids, Michigan. The Court 
did not consider the possibility of holding the car while one of the 
agents went for a warrant. Instead it recognized that the mobility of a 
vehicle, in contradistinction to a house or store, made it impracticable 
"to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of 
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."49 
However, the Court added that "[i]n cases where the securing of a 
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used."50 
In Chambers v. Maroney, 51 the Court dealt with a case in which a 
car had been seized by the police, its occupants arrested, and the car 
driven to the police station where it was searched without a warrant. 
While on the facts of Chambers it certainly would have been "practi-
cable" to obtain a warrant, the Court obviously considered the police 
activity reasonable anyway. It therefore relied on the "cars are differ-
ent from houses" language in Carroll to posit an exception to the war-
45. See MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 492-94 (1975) and sources cited 
therein. E.g., "in San Francisco in 1966 there were 29,084 serious crimes reported to the police, 
who during that same year obtained only 19 search warrants." Id. at 493-94 (footnote omitted). 
The statement in the text also reflects the author's own experience as an Assistant United States 
Attorney in Washington, D.C. 
46. At least as the term "warrant" is currently understood. But see the discussion of Model 
II, Part III infra. 
47. For example, in the 1982-83 Term, seven of the Supreme Court's nine decisions were 
reversals of the highest courts below. In each of the seven cases the court below had excluded 
evidence, not because of a strong ideological commitment to the exclusionary rule, but rather, as 
the opinions of those courts make clear, because a prior decision of the Supreme Court seemed to 
demand such exclusion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227-30 (1983) (Supreme 
Court's discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision). 
48. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
49. 267 U.S. at 153. 
50. 267 U.S. at 156. 
51. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
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rant requirement in cases involving automobile searches.52 Thus the 
"auto exception" grew to accommodate police behavior which, though 
violative of both the general warrant requirement and the express 
"practicability" holding of Carroll, seemed reasonable to the Court. 
Indeed, a contrary holding would have brought down a rain of criti-
cism on the Court for suppressing evidence due to technicalities. Sev-
eral other cases followed in which the Court, in approving what 
apparently seemed like reasonable behavior by the police, extended the 
automobile exception to the taking of paint scrapings from the outside 
of a car, 53 the search of a car at the station when no exigent circum-
stances had prevented an immediate search on the street (unlike 
Chambers),54 and the full inventory search of a car being towed due to 
parking violations. 55 
Most recently, in United States v. Ross, 56 the Court expanded the 
automobile exception even more by holding that not only may an au-
tomobile be searched on probable cause without a warrant regardless 
of whether it would have been practicable to obtain one, 57 but also 
that containers found therein, including locked suitcases, may be 
searched as well. In so holding, the Court overruled or modified pre-
vious cases that had granted suitcases, as repositories of personal ef-
fects, the same protection as houses, even when they were found in 
cars.58 
Thus the Court must constantly tinker with its rules as it is faced 
with the choice of either excluding evidence due to "technicalities" or 
upholding police behavior that fails to conform to the rules. In Ross 
the Court hit upon a solution to this dilemma - the very solution 
proposed, in broader terms, by Model I: abandon the warrant re-
quirement. By doing this for a substantial body of cases the Court has 
freed two or three of its eighteen hands from the tarbaby. But such a 
partial effort has two problems. First, Ross leaves many questions un-
52. 399 U.S. at 48-49. 
53. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). 
54. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). 
55. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
56. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
57. It may be that the admonition of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) 
(plurality opinion) that "(t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears" still retains vitality as to a car parked on private prop• 
erty. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974). However, Professor LaFave has pointed 
out that "given the fact that neither the 'practical consideration' nor the historical underpinnings 
stressed by the Ross majority are limited to vehicles actually on the move immediately prior to 
police intervention, it is highly unlikely that Ross will be construed to be so limited." W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 235 (Pocket Part 1985) (citation omitted). 
58. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (distinguished in Ross). 
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answered which threaten to suck the Court back into the morass. For 
example, is a recreational vehicle, which has the privacy aspects of a 
house and the mobility of a car, subject to the automobile exception?59 
Is the scope of a search incident to arrest greater when one is arrested 
in an automobile than at home? And, the question reserved by Ross: 
What, after Ross, is the scope of "less-than-probable cause" searches 
of automobiles, such as inventory searches?60 
The second problem with Ross is that, while abandoning the war-
rant requirement, it has adopted a new rule which may lead to injus-
tices in other cases. In United States v. Chadwick, the Court 
recognized that "[n]o less than one who locks the doors of his home 
against intruders, one who [locks his possessions in a footlocker] is due 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause."61 The 
fact that such a suitcase or footlocker was found in a car did not di-
minish its privacy protection.62 Now every such container found in a 
car will be subject to a search,63 notwithstanding Chadwick's recogni-
tion that such warrantless intrusions constitute serious invasions of 
personal privacy, because the Court felt that clear rules were necessary 
in this area, even at the expense of "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy," which had previously been the (troublesomely flexible) basis of 
fourth amendment protections. 
Thus the automobile exception, which was originally developed to 
allow a flexible response to the mechanistic warrant requirement when 
the police behavior seemed reasonable, has developed a life of its own 
as a mechanistic rule. Even if, in a particular case, it would not seem 
reasonable to search a car and its contents without a warrant, the au-
tomobile exception has created a new rule that can be applied mechan-
ically to render patently unreasonable behavior "reasonable" under 
59. The Court has recently addressed this question. In California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 
(1985), the Court found the automobile exception applicable to the reasonable search of a mobile 
motor home parked in a downtown lot. Reasoning that the motor home was readily mobile, 
licensed to operate on public streets, subject to extensive regulation, and "so situated that an 
objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle," 105 
S. Ct. at 2070, the Court held that the warrantless search did not violate the fourth amendment. 
It noted that "to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a motor home ignores the fact that 
a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal 
activity." 105 S. Ct. at 2070. 
60. Ross. 456 U.S. at 809 n.11. 
61. 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). 
62. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) Qater modified by Ross, see note 58 supra 
and accompanying text; note 63 infra). 
63. Unless the police have waited for a container that they wanted to search to be put into a 
car. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), apparently still maintains sufficient vitality to 
prevent this practice. See Y. Kamisar, United States v. Ross: The Court Takes Another Look at 
the Container-in-the-Car Situation in J. CHOPER, Y. ICAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME 
CoURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, at 71, 83 (1983). 
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the fourth amendment. 64 Suppose the police suspect A of committing 
a crime on a particular date. They have probable cause to believe that 
a suitcase belonging to B, which is locked in the trunk of B's car, 
which is parked in front of B's house, contains B's locked diary, which 
has references to A's whereabouts on that date.65 Under the automo-
bile exception, the police, having only probable cause, may conduct a 
warrantless search of the car for the suitcase and the suitcase for the 
diary even though they have no reason to believe that the car is about 
to be moved. 66 Yet there are few instances in which one would have a 
greater expectation of privacy than in a locked diary in a locked suit-
case in the locked trunk of one's own car parked in front of one's own 
house.67 
64. As Professor Haddad has observed, "If [a] search is unreasonable under all the facts, it 
should not be upheld simply because the facts fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions, 
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not been true to this logic." Haddad, supra note 
22, at 203. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist has criticized the Court for striking down 
essentially reasonable searches or seizures because they fail to conform to the strict terms of one 
of the fourth amendment exceptions. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) ("Analyzed simply in terms of its 'reasonableness' as that term is used in the 
Fourth Amendment, the conduct of the investigating officers toward Royer would pass muster 
with virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly steeped in the mysteries of this Court's 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."). 
65. It is clear that a car parked in such a "public place" is subject to the automobile excep• 
tion. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1974). 
66. After Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), we must assume that a warrant• 
less search of a car is permissible upon probable cause even if the car is stopped just outside a 
building which houses both a police station and a court, even if the sole occupant of the vehicle is 
arrested, and even if a magistrate is (immediately) available. Haddad, supra note 22, at 203. 
This result would also be supported by the holding in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978), that innocent third parties are not exempt from searches for evidence. 
67. Consider also Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), in which the Court made the 
definitive statement of the scope of searches incident to arrest: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested 
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or 
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest 
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for 
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or de-
struction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a 
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one 
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" - construing 
that phrase to mean the area from within which be might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence. 
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other 
than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk 
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. 
395 U.S. at 762-63 (emphasis added). 
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court found that "[a]rticles inside the 
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, 
even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab n 
weapon or evidentiary ite[m].'" 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime/, 395 U.S. at 763), Thus, in an 
effort to provide a "single familiar standard ... to guide police officers," 453 U.S. at 458 (quot• 
ing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)), the Court upheld the search of a jacket 
May 1985] Two Models of the Fourth Amendment 1479 
The "open fields doctrine," another exception to the warrant re-
quirement, which was recently reaffirmed in Oliver v. United States, 68 
further exemplifies the problems with the fourth amendment. In Oli-
ver, the Court declared that a fenced, posted field behind a house was 
not a "person, house, paper or effect" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment and consequently was not subject to the warrant require-
ment. The Court did not explain why a phone booth was such a "per-
son, house, paper and/or effect," as held in Katz v. United States, 69 
when a fenced, posted field was not, but based its decision on the not 
unreasonable proposition that it is necessary to give clear guidelines to 
the police, 70 viz., "You can search open fields; you can't bug phone 
booths." While it may or may not be true that, in general, one has a 
greater expectation of privacy in a phone booth than in the fields be-
hind one's house, even the most ardent defender of the decision would 
admit that there will be some cases when the reverse is true. Surely if 
one has a twelve-foot high electrified fence around a thirty-foot-square 
piece of land with snarling attack dogs inside, one has a greater expec-
tation of privacy than in a phone booth where one has stopped to call 
"Weather." Even the lowly automobile outranks the backyard as a 
haven for privacy (since it at least counts as an "effect," and is subject 
to the probable cause, though not the warrant, requirement). 
By providing a "clear rule," Oliver will cause individual cases to be 
decided unjustly. Moreover, the "clear rule" is not so clear. Oliver 
fails to answer the question of whether a chicken house, tool shed, or 
cardboard box, when found in an open field, is covered by the fourth 
amendment. The tarbaby beckons. 
In an effort to give "clear rules" to the police while maintaining a 
degree of :flexibility, the Court has failed on both counts. Each "clear 
rule" has left unanswered questions which have turned it into an un-
clear rule. Yet the application of these rules as if they were bright line 
rules ("you can search cars without a warrant") leads to injustices in 
many cases - either the injustice of allowing governmental intrusions 
into areas where one reasonably expects privacy or that of excluding 
evidence based on "technicalities" where the police have tried to fol-
low the unclear rules. The response of many critics to these problems 
that was inaccessible to the defendant at the time of the search and generally approved the search 
of the passenger compartments of cars as incident to the arrest of people in those cars, regardless 
of whether the compartment was an "area within the immediate control" of the arrestee. 453 
U.S. at 462-63. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 7.1 (Pocket Part 1985) for a detailed critique 
of Belton. 
68. 104 s. Ct. 1735 (1984). 
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
10. See Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742-43. 
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created by the Court's confused doctrine has been to suggest abolition 
of the exclusionary rule. Opposing critics suggest that to do so would 
be to sever a vital branch from the tree of liberty. 
The manner in which this debate and the Court's energies have 
been misfocused can be illustrated by a parable: Suppose there is a 
sporting contest in which the rules provide that "anyone guilty of un-
reasonable smucking shall be expelled from the game" (the expulsion-
ary rule). "Smucking" is defined as jabbing another player "in an area 
where he has an expectation of privacy," but no one knows what "un-
reasonable" smucking is. Everyone is agreed that at least some of the 
more egregious smucking must be punished and that no other way to 
deter such conduct has proved effective. This rule is unpopular with 
the fans as it interferes with the game (of course, they aren't the ones 
being smucked), so the Rules Committee has endeavored to set up 
more detailed standards such as "smucking is permitted under exigent 
circumstances" and "the expulsionary rule won't apply if the smuck-
ing is done in good faith" in order to limit more carefully what con-
duct is and is not prohibited. Unfortunately, this attempt has only led 
to more confusion which the Committee has tried to alleviate by 
promulgating even more standards and exceptions which, far from 
clarifying the rules, have only made them more confusing. In re-
sponse, a group of fans has urged abolition of the expulsionary rule, 
arguing that "it's stupid to expel the smucker because we can see that 
a lot of people are thrown out unjustly and anyway, by the time he is 
thrown out, the injury to the smuckee is complete." Others respond, 
"yes, but that's the only way to deter smucking" or "the integrity of 
the game demands it." Studies have been conducted to see if expulsion 
really does deter smucking, and it is asked how often smuckers are 
thrown out, as if the answer proved something about the efficacy of the 
rule. (If smuckers are thrown out a lot does it prove that the rule is 
bad because it expels a lot of players unjustly or desperately needed 
because there are so many dirty smuckers these days?) In all of the 
fuss about the expulsionary rule, everybody has lost track of the fact 
that the real problem is the Rules Committee's failure either to define 
"unreasonable" smucking in such a way that players and referees can 
readily understand and follow the rules or to abandon the attempt and 
simply leave it to the judgment of the referees, on a case-by-case basis, 
to determine whether smucking was unreasonable or not, much as a 
baseball umpire determines what conduct justifies the expulsion of an 
argumentative manager. 
To be sure, defining "unreasonable" searches and seizures clearly 
is more difficult than defining behavior that occurs in the more nar-
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rowly circumscribed confines of a game. Still, the argument that since 
the rules are difficult to formulate we ought to abolish the penalty or 
create unclear exceptions to the (unclear) rules is a non sequitur. Cer-
tainly the primary focus of attention should be on clarifying the rules 
rather than making them increasingly unclear by focusing attention on 
penalties and exceptions. The Models that follow attempt to accom-
plish this. 
II. MODEL I 
Model I, no lines, demands only that searches be reasonable, based 
upon a consideration of the facts of each individual case. 71 In deter-
mining the factual question of reasonableness, the Court should con-
sider not only whether there was a warrant, probable cause, or exigent 
circumstances, but also such factors as the nature of the intrusion (i.e., 
was it a search for private papers or narcotics, a search of a house or of 
a barn, etc.), the strength of the evidence possessed by the police, the 
dangerousness of the defendant, and the seriousness of the crime. 72 
Given the long tradition of the warrant and probable cause require-
ments, the presence or absence of these factors should probably be the 
most important, but not necessarily the controlling, elements. A lesser 
intrusion, such as a seizure of evidence in a fenced field behind the 
defendant's house, would be unlikely to require a warrant, whereas a 
search of a house probably would. Yet, as discussed above, one can 
conceive of a case where the suspect's expectation of privacy in his 
field is so clearly announced, or the need to search a house so great, 
that rules developed in other cases would not be applicable. Conse-
quently, fixed criteria such as the "warrant requirement," the "exigent 
circumstances exception," and the "open fields doctrine" should be 
avoided. Rather, each case must be evaluated on its own facts, recog-
nizing that, because no two cases will have completely identical facts, 
prior decisions may only be indicative but not dispositive of future 
cases. 73 This model is drawn from European criminal procedure and 
71. Dean Erwin Griswold, in his book SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1975), described his "working 
rule" in deciding whether, as Solicitor General, he should seek review of adverse search and 
seizure cases: "If the police officer acted decently, and if he did what you would expect a good, 
careful, conscientious police officer to do under the circumstances, then he should be supported." 
Id. at 58. While Griswold did not propose this as the constitutional rule, he obviously felt that 
such a "reasonableness" approach should underlie the rules. 
72. This is not to say that the police must consider a complicated list of factors before they 
can act. See Professor LaFave's criticism of Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) in LaFave, ''Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Wa"ant, 
Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 454-58 (1984). Rather, it is to suggest 
that all relevant factors of which the police should reasonably have been aware should be taken 
into account by the courts in their subsequent evaluation of the police conduct. 
73. The statement that "reasonableness" is based on the facts of the individual case should 
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American tort law. It frankly recognizes that it gives no guidance to 
police as to how to behave, beyond admonishing them to act reason-
ably, because such guidance is inherently impossible to give. 
The Supreme Court has frequently referred to reasonableness as 
the "fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues"74 
and has described its decisional process as "balancing [the] intrusion 
[of a particular law enforcement practice] on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmen-
tal interests."75 Such an inquiry and balancing is precisely what is 
proposed here. However, when the Court speaks of "reasonableness" 
and "balancing" it means deciding whether a particular practice, such 
as "stop and frisk," is reasonable when performed without a warrant 
in a particular case and, having once decided that it is, allowing it in 
all future cases. 76 This is an exercise fraught with obvious peril. The 
Court does not mean that such balancing should be engaged in on a 
case-by-case basis as Model I proposes. 77 Indeed, the Court recently 
firmly rejected the possibility of determining "reasonableness" case by 
case: 
Under this approach, police officers would have to guess before every 
search whether landowners bad erected fences sufficiently high, posted a 
sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area suf-
ficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy. The lawfulness of a 
search would turn on "[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by 
all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions . . . ."78 
This criticism, however, is far more applicable to current doctrine, 
in which the Court has "iffed, anded, and butted" the fourth amend-
not be taken as characterizing "reasonableness" as a question of fact that precludes appellate 
review. On the contrary, "reasonableness" is a legal question decided by the trial judge, out of 
the presence of the jury and fully subject to appellate review. However, by the time such a fact-
bound decision would come to the Supreme Court it is likely that the Court would only rarely 
consider such a case to have sufficient general import to warrant a grant of certiori. 
74. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 19 
(1968). 
75. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983). 
76. The Court's discussion of the need to provide clear rules to police in New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1981), is a good example of this process at work. 
77. Justice Rehnquist has, however, advanced a notion of case-by-case reasonableness similar 
to that suggested by Model I: "[T]he constitutionality of a particular search [or seizure] is a 
question of reasonableness and depends on 'a balance between the public interest and the individ-
ual's right to personal security .••. '" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). See also note 64 supra. 
78. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742-43 (1984) (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case 
Adjudication" Versus ''Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. er. REV. 
127, 142); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981). 
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ment into hopeless confusion, than it is to a case-by-case reasonable-
ness test. Such a test requires an evaluation of the facts of each case, 
not a "sophisticated set of rules," to determine whether the police 
have acted reasonably. "Reasonable" police behavior should not de-
pend on their ability to conform to a complex set of rules as they are 
currently required to do. It makes no sense to say that, because it was 
reasonable for a policeman to search a car in one case without a war-
rant, an "automobile exception" is now created whereby if police fol-
low the rules (i.e., have probable cause) they can always search cars 
without warrants. The richness of the facts of each search renders it 
impossible to create a rule in one case that will be readily applicable to 
all later cases. Yet all of the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
previously noted were created in just this way. An example will show 
how a case-by-case approach can help to eliminate the irrational re-
sults that the present system requires. 
Suppose the police have a certain amount of evidence that a crazed 
murder suspect armed with a submachine gun is at his summer cot-
tage with a captive. Because they contemplate an arrest in a house, a 
warrant based on probable cause is normally required. The police, not 
sure of the precise definitions of either of the following terms, conclude 
that they have "probable cause" and "exigent circumstances" and 
consequently they enter without a warrant and arrest the suspect. On 
the motion to suppress the court concludes that the police were abso-
lutely right about exigent circumstances-this was a true emergency. 
However, they were wrong about probable cause - they did not actu-
ally have enough (whatever "enough" is after Illinois v. Gates19) to 
conclude that the suspect was at the summer house. 
Since, under the current rules, the exigent circumstances do not 
affect the issue of probable cause ( only the need for a warrant if prob-
able cause is otherwise established), 80 the submachine gun and any 
other evidence seized incident to the arrest as well as, possibly, any 
statements made by the suspect at the time of arrest81 must be ex-
cluded. 82 In order to avoid this distasteful result, the courts will be 
tempted to tinker with the definition of probable cause, stretching it, 
79. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
SO. But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (finding "exigencies" to justify a search 
of the passenger compartment of a car even though there was no warrant, no probable cause, and 
no arrest). 
81. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
82. The Court has not always taken this view. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931), a unanimous Court held: "There is no formula for the determination 
of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." See also 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (later overruled by Chime! v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969)). 
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just a little more, to accommodate this case. 83 To simply examine all 
relevant factors and conclude that here the police acted reasonably 
seems far more sensible. 
The folly of trying to develop rules in one case which will then 
apply to all others was recognized long ago in tort law. In 1927 the 
Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, endeavored to "la[y] down [a 
standard] once for all" regarding "reasonable" conduct of an automo-
bile driver when approaching an unmarked railroad crossing - the 
"stop, look, and listen" rule. 84 As every student of torts knows, this 
attempt failed because the rule simply made no sense when the courts 
attempted to apply it to the many unforeseeable fact situations that 
developed. 85 After eight years the Court abandoned the attempt, em-
phasizing the "need for caution in framing standards of behavior that 
amount to rules of law." "Extraordinary situations," the court ob-
served, "may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations 
that are fitting for the commonplace or normal."86 
Prosser has elaborated on the problem: 
A decision of an appellate court that under certain circumstances a par-
ticular type of conduct is clearly negligent, or that it clearly is not negli-
gent, . . . establishes a precedent for other cases where the facts are 
identical, or substantially the same. To that extent it may define the stan-
dard of reasonable conduct which the community requires. Unfortu-
nately, the inevitable tendency [is] to crystallize the law into mechanical 
rules . . . of universal application. Almost invariably the rule has bro-
ken down in the face of the necessity of basing the standard upon the 
83. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), is a good example of where the Court has, once 
again, stretched doctrine to justify what is considered to be reasonable behavior by police, despite 
the fact that that conduct was plainly inconsistent with prior holdings. In Long the police saw a 
car swerve into a ditch. When they asked the driver for the registration and he went to get it from 
the car, the police noticed a knife on the floor. One of the officers then stopped and frisked Long 
while the other searched the passenger compartment of the car, finding marijuana. 
It is easy to agree with the Court that this police behavior was not unreasonable under all the 
circumstances. It is, however, difficult to accept the Court's claim that this decision follows from 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Long dissent, 463 U.S. at 
1054-56, Terry approved only a very limited frisk of the outer clothing for weapons. See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30. In Long. based on a combination of reasonable suspicion and exigent circum• 
stances, the Court approved a full search of a car's passenger compartment when the suspect was 
not in, and could easily have been kept out of, the car. Because the Court felt the need to stretch 
old doctrine to accommodate the next case, it has now created a new rule, apparently justifying 
the search of cars (and purses, briefcases, and luggage?) anytime the police reasonably suspect a 
weapon to be within. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 3.8(e), at 310 
(1984). 
84. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927). 
85. Prosser describes the impact of the "stop, look, and listen" rule of Goodman: 
A long series of cases in which gates were left open, or the driver relied upon the absence of 
a flagman, or it was clear that the conduct specified would have added nothing to the 
driver's safety, made it quite apparent that no such inflexible rule could be applied. 
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 218 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted). 
86. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934). 
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particular circumstances, the apparent risk, and the actor's opportunity 
to deal with it. 87 
In fourth amendment law the inquiry is essentially the same as in 
tort law: "Did the authorities act as reasonable policemen?"88 The 
Court's many exceptions to the warrant requirement are a recognition 
of the difficulty of actually enforcing a hard and fast rule that warrants 
must always be used, subject to a few "well-delineated exceptions."89 
As noted, in the course of dealing with new fact situations these excep-
tions tend to become many and ill-defined.9° Consequently no realistic 
guidance is provided to the police because such guidance could only 
come from a very simple, straightforward rule. An ad hoc approach 
which seems to have created little controversy may be found in the 
Court's test for whether a pretrial photographic identification is ad-
missible in evidence: whether the identification procedure "was so im-
permissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification."91 While it is unquestionably easier to 
determine whether a photo identification was impermissibly suggestive 
than to determine if a search was unreasonable, the two tests do oper-
ate in a similar fashion; neither gives much guidance to the police and 
both avoid the unpalatable result of patently reasonable and responsi-
ble police work leading to evidentiary exclusion while allowing exclu-
sion in every case where the police have acted irresponsibly. 
To be sure, Model I will require that the fourth amendment be 
read somewhat differently than it has been in the past. The first 
phrase, forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, will take over, 
87. W. PROSSER,supra note 85, at 217-18 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in applying the fifth 
amendment injunction against the taking of private property without just compensation, the 
Court has recognized its inability "to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and 
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the govern-
ment." Instead, the decisions are "ad hoc, factual inquiries" in which "several factors that have 
particular significance" are considered. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978). 
88. Thus, the approach suggested by Model I is the same as that used in determining the 
liability of police in search and seizure cases, wherein a variety of factors, including the serious-
ness of the crime, the chance of escape, etc., are considered. See generally REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 119, 121 comments (1965). This test is phrased in terms of the 
reasonableness of the police behavior rather than the reasonableness of the suspect's expectations 
of privacy, because it seems to ask too much of the police to require them to determine what the 
suspect's expectations may be. Normally the two tests will produce the same result. However, 
one can conceive of a case where they will not. Thus, it may seem perfectly reasonable for the 
police to search an apparently abandoned house without a warrant for evidence of a homicide. 
If, in fact, the house is not abandoned, such a search may be unreasonable from the defendant's 
point of view. To the extent that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test of Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), still survives, it would have to be overruled under Model I. 
89. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 390 (1978) which was, in turn, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
90. See generally notes 22-44 supra and accompanying text. 
91. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
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rendering the requirement that warrants must issue on probable cause 
less important since warrants would no longer be a precondition of 
reasonableness. The difficulties which the Court has created for itself 
by adoption of the fictitious warrant requirement have already been 
discussed. Moreover, there is considerable historical evidence that the 
view of the fourth amendment suggested by Model I is exactly what 
the framers of the Constitution had in mind and that the warrant re-
quirement, (as well as its myriad exceptions), as imposed by the Court, 
has " 'stood the fourth amendment on its head' from a historical 
standpoint."92 According to one authority on the history of the fourth 
amendment, the purpose of the requirement that warrants be based 
upon probable cause and specify the "place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized" was designed to limit the use of war-
rants, which had been widely abused, and not to imply that a warrant 
was a fundamental criterion of a reasonable search, as the Court now 
maintains.93 
Because the warrant requirement is largely a sham anyway, a de-
tailed historical justification for doing away with it hardly seems nec-
essary. The more important inquiry is whether such a proposal would 
prove workable. A compelling argument for Model I can be found in 
German practice where such an approach is used successfully, gener-
ating far less litigation and controversy than the American system. 
Under the German system, the question of the reasonableness of the 
search as such is not relevant, there being no precise equivalent to the 
fourth amendment. However, when the question of whether to admit 
or exclude seized evidence is considered, a balancing or reasonableness 
test is employed in virtually every case.94 The fact that the search may 
have violated the rules for searches set forth in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure is only one factor to be considered. More important is 
whether the intrusion on the defendant's privacy (whether caused by 
the search for the evidence or its use in court) is proportional to the 
92. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting 
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24 (1969)). 
93. Taylor summarized his examination of the historical evidence in T. TAYLOR, supra note 
92, at 43: 
[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about over-
reaching warrants. It is perhaps too much to say that they feared the warrant more than the 
search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the prime object of their concern. Far 
from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an 
authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and 
execution in line with the stringent requirements applicable to common-law warrants for 
stolen goods . . . . They took for granted that arrested persons could be searched without a 
search warrant, and nothing gave them cause for worry about warrantless searches. 
See also Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 873 (1960). 
94. The only exception is where evidence has been obtained through brutality or deceit, in 
which case exclusion is automatic. Bradley, supra note 16, at 1039-42. 
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seriousness of the offense, i.e., a case-by-case balancing test is applied. 
Thus, an individual's diary was excluded from evidence in a perjury 
case even though it was properly seized because the case did not war-
rant such a serious intrusion (the exposure of the diary's contents in 
court) into the private sphere of the individual.95 However, the court 
noted that the result might have been different in a murder c~se.96 In 
another case the court refused to issue an order to take spinal fluid 
from a suspect in a misdemeanor case to determine his possible in-
sanity, despite the fact that such a taking was authorized by the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. The court reasoned that such a drastic intru-
sion was out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime.97 
If the Supreme Court were to opt for Model I, infinite flexibility, 
then it would not have to decide whether recreational vehicles (RVs) 
are subject to the "automobile exception" or what the scope of a 
search incident to arrest might be. The infinite variety of possibilities 
which each search presents makes it impossible to declare with confi-
dence that RVs or automobiles or boats or suitcases are or are not 
entitled to the protection afforded by a warrant in every case. It may 
even happen that if police are enjoined to think about the facts of each 
case and act appropriately, rather than to follow an incomprehensible 
set of rules, they will prove capable of exercising more judgment than 
had previously been believed.98 
95. Contrary to the German practice, this Article does not propose excluding reasonably 
seized evidence on the ground that its use in court would cause an additional, impermissible 
intrusion on the defendant's privacy. However, the effect of Model I would be much the same 
since it would be harder to justify the seizure of a diary, as opposed to a gun, as being reasonable 
in the first place. 
96. Bradley, supra note 16, at 1042-43 (citing Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, 19 BGHSt 325,331 
(decision of the High Federal Court)). 
Last term, for the first time, the Court lent some support to the notion that the seriousness of 
the crime is a factor to be considered in search and seizure cases. In considering whether an 
individual could be arrested in his home without a warrant, the Court declared that "the pre-
sumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries . . . is difficult to 
rebut" when "the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense." Welsh v. Wiscon-
sin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1984) (footnote omitted). It would seem to follow, therefore, that in 
serious felony cases, warrantless entries might be more likely to be considered reasonable than in 
misdemeanor cases, all other things being equal. 
Similarly, there is some support in Supreme Court cases for the notion that the nature of the 
thing to be seized - a diary versus a gun - may affect the reasonableness of a search, but thus 
far the Court has not explicitly endorsed such a distinction. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391,400 n.7 (1976) (approving an IRS summons for the tax records of petitioners' account-
ants and noting that "[s]pecial problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a 
personal diary ... are not involved here"). See generally Bradley, Constitutional Protection for 
Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461 (1981) (arguing that a constitutional distinction 
should be drawn between private papers and other items which the government may wish to 
seize). 
97. Bradley, supra note 16, at 1041 (citing Judgment of June 10, 1963, 16 BVerfG 194, 202 
(decision of the Constitutional Court)). 
98. Adoption of a "reasonableness" test would allow the Court to apply a "least intrusive 
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What are the advantages and disadvantages of Model I? The most 
obvious advantage is that it will extract the Court from the tarbaby of 
fourth amendment law. While an occasional decision on a lower 
court's determination of reasonableness may be in order, the Supreme 
Court will generally find it unnecessary to involve itself in decisions 
that are unique to the facts of each case. To free the Court from a 
series of decisions that has brought it both disruption and a degree of 
disrepute is no small gain. Furthermore, exclusionary law can be re-
stored to the common sense proposition that evidence obtained unrea-
sonably must always be excluded and evidence obtained reasonably 
should always be admitted. Such a rule makes far better sense than 
the rather bizarre rule established recently in Leon99 that if an unrea-
sonable search is performed reasonably then the evidence will be ad-
missible anyway.100 
The second, and greater, advantage is that evidence will neither be 
excluded nor admitted due to legal technicalities. A minor error by 
the police in drafting or executing a warrant or in assessing whether 
adequate cause exists for an automobile search will probably not lead 
to exclusion, at least in more serious cases. But such legal technicali-
ties as the "automobile exception," the "open fields doctrine" or 
"standing" which currently prohibit exclusion, even in the face of 
gross violations of individual expectations of privacy in particular 
cases, need not stand in the way of exclusion due to unreasonableness. 
The principal disadvantage of Model I is that warrants may be 
used less if they are not strictly required. As pointed out, however, 
they are not really strictly required or frequently used now. More-
over, there may be institutional factors, such as the prosecutor's desire 
to oversee police activities, fear of tort suits, 101 ease of conducting 
means" analysis which would require the government to obtain evidence in ways which impinged 
as little as possible on the suspect's rights. Thus, if evidence could be obtained by subpoena, a 
subpoena should be employed instead of a search. But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547 (1978) (authorizing searches of innocent third parties even though the evidence could have 
been obtained by subpoena). The Court currently rejects such an approach on the ground that 
"it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine 
and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched and which must be 
sealed as a unit." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). Yet such an approach is em• 
ployed satisfactorily in Germany. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 1041. See also Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion), in which such an approach was required in investi-
gative detentions. It is also standard law in first amendment cases. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 685 (1978). Of course, failure to employ the least intrusive means 
should not be dispositive of the reasonableness calculation, but simply a factor to consider. 
99. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
100. See Bradley, supra note 8. Justice Stevens emphasized the contradictory nature of the 
Leon rule in his concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 
3446 (1984). 
101. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 ("In choosing to search without a 
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searches when the householder is presented with a warrant, etc., 
which would deter the police from cutting back warrant use substan-
tially from current levels, especially if courts make it clear that the 
presence of a warrant is an important factor in the reasonableness de-
termination.102 To the extent that society concludes that certain po-
lice activities, such as wiretapping, are so threatening that they should 
be regulated in more detail, the legislature can prescribe the necessary 
rules. Such rulemaking would seem to be a more appropriate activity 
for the legislative than the judicial branch in any case. Indeed, state 
legislatures or Congress could, if they desired, promulgate detailed 
guidelines governing police behavior in diverse situations, as does the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure. But there is no compelling rea-
son that the failure to follow such guidelines in a given case should 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the federal constitutional stan-
dard of "reasonableness" has been violated.103 
The other major argument against Model I is that the police, given 
no guidelines, will be hopelessly confused, and trial courts will render 
decisions dependent largely on the predilections of the individual 
judge. On the contrary, enjoining the police to use their common 
sense and judging them by that standard, while not an ideal guideline, 
seems more likely to produce sensible responses than does a set of ficti-
tious rules and vague exceptions that the Supreme Court itself, not to 
mention the cop on the beat, cannot consistently apply or under-
stand.104 Moreover, the decisions of the courts will at least be based 
upon a comprehensible standard, which goes farther down the road to 
"justice" than the current vehicle.105 A judge's personal opinion as to 
warrant on their own assessment of probable cause, police officers of course lose the protection 
that a warrant would provide to them in an action for damages brought by an individual claim-
ing that the search was unconstitutional."). 
102. The Supreme Court may be said to have supported this notion in the recent Leon deci-
sion because it created an exception to the exclusionary rule only in cases where warrants are 
obtained. Thus the police are encouraged to use warrants. See Bradley, supra note 8. 
103. The Court has already taken this approach with regard to violations of the wiretapping 
statute. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
104. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 269 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) 
("Searches and seizures are an opaque area of the law . . • . There is a vast twilight zone with 
respect to which one Justice has stated that our own 'decisions ... are hardly notable for their 
predictability,' and another has observed that this Court was ' "bifurcating elements too infinites-
imal to be split."'") (citations omitted) (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in result), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting in part) (quoting Justice Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court)) . 
105. There are those who would claim that allowing such a decision on a difficult-to-review, 
case-by-case basis would lead not only to arbitrary, but also to largely anti-defendant, decisions 
because of the biases built into the "establishment-oriented" judicial system. See Amsterdam, 
The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (1970). 
But see Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Wa"en Court, 75 
MICH. L. REv. 1319, 1422 n.433 (1977) (arguing that the judicial systems of many areas are now 
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"reasonableness," subject to appellate review, is more likely to pro-
duce a sensible result than is his personal opinion as to whether a rec-
reational vehicle is an automobile, or a chicken house part of an open 
field, from which flows, mechanically, his decision that certain police 
conduct was "reasonable" or not. 
It may be argued that this "reasonableness" formulation of the 
fourth amendment is too much like the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" 
standard in fifth amendment cases that was widely deplored as being 
useless and "downright misleading."106 While Model I is admittedly 
as vague as the voluntariness test, it is not misleading because it fo-
cuses on the ultimate question of fourth amendment law - whether 
the search is reasonable. Voluntariness, on the other hand, did not 
"focus directly on either the risk of untrue confessions nor the offen-
siveness of police interrogation methods."107 Secondly, some of the 
major practical arguments against the voluntariness test, such as 
"[t]he weak were manipulated" and "[a]pplication of the standard was 
fatally dependent upon resolution of 'the swearing contest,' " 108 are 
not applicable to a reasonableness test for searches. Indeed, depriving 
the police of such useful, determinative catchphrases as "furtive ges-
ture" and "plain view" might serve to reduce the "swearing contest" 
aspect of many exclusionary hearings that exists under the current sys-
tem (i.e., it's harder for the police to lie if they can't be sure just what 
"facts" will be determinative). Nevertheless, some (or many) readers 
will undoubtedly believe that failure to give guidelines to the police is a 
fatal fl.aw in any proposal for reform of search and seizure law. These 
also populated with former defense attorneys, minorities, and others who may be expected to be 
sympathetic to defendants). Justice Powell's observation, concurring in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972), seems apt: "[T]his Court should not assume that the past insensitivity of 
some state courts to the rights of defendants will continue." 
See also Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
257, 309-20 (1984), for further discussion of perceived problems with a "reasonableness" ap-
proach. I do not follow Professor Wasserstrom's argument that it "makes little or no sense'' to 
apply the exclusionary rule to a search deemed unreasonable on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 319. 
On the contrary, it makes more sense to suppress evidence on the basis of all information avail-
able to the policeman than it does to suppress it because, as under the current system, the trial 
court disagrees with the policeman's judgment that a chicken house is part of an open field. 
Contrary to Professor Wasserstrom's assertion, I see no reason why the fact that evidence actu-
ally was or was not found should influence a court's determination of reasonableness any more 
than it influences a judgment as to the existence of probable cause under the present system. 
106. E.g .• Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND 
CoNFESSIONS 1, 15 (Y. Kamisar ed. 1980). 
107. Id. 
108. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-72 
(1981). Schulhofer summarized the principal arguments against the voluntariness standard as 
(1) it left police without needed guidance, (2) it impaired the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
judicial review, (3) its application was fatally dependent upon resolution of "the swearing con-
test," (4) considerable interrogation pressure was allowed, (5) the weak were manipulated, and 
(6) physical brutality was not adequately checked. 
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readers should tum, as did the Supreme Court in Miranda, to a Model 
II, "bright lines," approach. 
To summarize, Model I gives both the police and the reviewing 
court the opportunity to consider all relevant factors in determining 
whether a search, with or without a warrant, is appropriate in a given 
case. Such traditionally important factors as whether the police have a 
warrant, whether there is probable cause, and whether a home is being 
searched must weigh most heavily in the calculus. Other possible fac-
tors include the seriousness of the offense, the need to act quickly, the 
strength of the evidence (i.e., evidence even more certain than prob-
able cause would more readily justify a warrantless search), the nature 
of the property to be seized (e.g., a diary versus the contents of a gar-
bage can), the nature of the entry (day or night; forcible or peaceful), 
the scope of the search, etc. This is not to suggest that the police must 
carry around a checklist and account for all of these factors before 
searching. These are simply common sense matters that the police 
will naturally tend to consider. The bottom line is all that matters. If 
the police acted reasonably, the evidence is admitted. If they acted 
unreasonably, the evidence must be suppressed, whether or not they 
had a warrant. If they acted unreasonably they could not, by defini-
tion, have acted in "reasonable good faith," so the contradictory result 
of Leon, where police could conduct an "unreasonable" search "rea-
sonably," is eliminated. Much of the language in Leon and Gates 
seems to recognize the need for such a "reasonableness" approach, but 
the Court's continued adherence to the warrant requirement and its 
exceptions as providing necessary "guidelines" to the police has pre-
vented it from adopting anything approaching such a straightforward 
test. 
III. MODEL II 
Model I is founded on a belief that the officials charged with oper-
ating our criminal justice system - the police and the courts - will 
be better off if enjoined to act reasonably and reviewed on that basis, 
than if, as under the current arrangement, they are expected to obey a 
set of incomprehensible rules. This view flies in the face of the 
Supreme Court's recent criminal procedure jurisprudence which as-
sumes that giving more or less exact guidelines to the police is the 
overriding function of the Court's decisions. 109 If the Court and the 
109. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the majority and dissenting opin-
ions came very near to advancing the two models suggested here. In approving extensive war-
rantless searches incident to arrest, the majority held that: 
What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution 
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legal community at large cannot give up this long held view of crimi-
nal procedure law, then it is necessary to develop a rule which really 
does give guidance to the police and the courts. That is, a simple, 
easily obeyed rule that will actually apply in most cases.110 Model II 
will accomplish this by requiring a warrant in all but genuine emer-
gencies but by allowing the warrant to be granted orally on the basis of 
an oral (telephoned or radioed) submission, provided only that the 
submission be tape recorded so that its sufficiency can later be tested at 
a motion to suppress. 111 Under the recent holding in United States v. 
Leon, 112 technical problems with this procedure, such as the failure of 
the magistrate to record the call, breakdown of the recorder, etc., as 
well as defects in the content of the application would be subject to the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
Model II proposes that a warrant truly be required except when 
absolutely prevented by an emergency. This means twenty-four-hour-
a-day availability of magistrates (assuming the police want to search 
twenty-four hours a day). It means that before searching an automo-
does not define what are "unreasonable" searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have 
no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must 
find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. 
339 U.S. at 63 (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)). 
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant au-
thorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." 339 U.S. at 70. Rabinowitz 
was overruled in Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), because it gave too much leeway to 
searches incident to arrest. While the Court currently pays lip service to Justice Frankfurter's 
view, as discussed above, the reality of current decisions is a failed compromise between the two 
views advanced in Rabinowitz. 
110. In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, an attorney from the (conservative) Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation opined that the Court's recent efforts to "help" the police by creat-
ing more and more exceptions to the exclusionary rule are only making matters more confusing, 
and therefore worse for police and public alike. 
Police will increasingly err, often through no fault of their own, on the wrong side of the 
law. Evidence will be thrown out that could have been properly secured and our interest in 
punishing the guilty will drown in a heated sea of argument because of the [C]ourt's failure 
to draw clear rules. 
In eight years of representing police unions and instructing officers on the laws of search 
and seizure, I learned how vital it is for the courts to provide meaningful guidance as to 
what officers can and cannot do. In the absence of firm rules the police will err on the wrong 
side of the line. Although it is a widely perceived myth that police officers detest the exclu-
sionary rule, most I know have accepted the rule well - it enhances police training and has 
raised the level of police professionalism. 
Oade, The High Court Sows Confusion, Wall St. J., July 13, 1984, at 18, col. 4 (emphasis added). 
111. Oral search warrants are already allowed in several states and in the federal system but 
have not been approved by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2); W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 4.3(c) (Professor LaFave sees no valid constitutional objection to this 
practice). Professor Grano has proposed that warrants be required in all but exigent circum-
stance cases. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 603 (1982). However, Grano does not propose the use of oral warrants, thus running the 
risk that his exigent circumstance exception will consume his rule. 
112. 104 s. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
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bile, the police must radio in for a warrant. In short, Model II does 
for the fourth amendment what Miranda v. Arizona113 did for the fifth: 
it establishes a relatively simple, 114 straightforward rule that can be 
applied in virtually every case. Just as in fifth amendment cases, there 
would be litigation as to whether or not the rule were applicable at all 
(i.e., "is this a search?" vs. "is this a custodial interrogation?") but far 
less confusion than at present. Also, just as with Miranda, the declar-
ation of such a rule by the Court would lead to much hair-tearing and 
teeth-gnashing by police, who would complain that they were being 
"handcuffed." But the police could get used to radioing for permis-
sion before conducting a search, just as they have gotten used to 
"reading the rights" before questioning a suspect. The advantage of 
knowing that they must act according to fixed guidelines in most cir-
cumstances and of knowing that their plan of action, having been ap-
proved by the magistrate, is appropriate and will virtually always 
render the evidence admissible, will soon outweigh their temporary 
feeling of being hamstrung by legal rules. 
To be sure, in terms of protection of individual rights, a traditional 
written warrant is better than an oral one. The traditional warrant 
procedure forces the police to take more time and to be more careful. 
It allows the magistrate an opportunity to deliberate and to be sure 
that everything is in its proper place. But it is precisely this delibera-
tiveness that is the downfall of the present system. The written war-
rant requirement of the eighteenth century simply cannot apply to 
most police-citizen encounters in the highly mobile twentieth century. 
It is this cumbersomeness that has led the Court to declare so many 
exceptions to the warrant "requirement." It is time to take advantage 
of such technological advances as readily portable two-way radios (in-
cluding wrist radios) and tape recorders to bring the warrant require-
ment up to date. 
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
114. The Miranda rule was relatively simple until the two recent decisions in New York v. 
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984), and Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), began to create the 
sorts of exceptions to the Miranda requirements that have gotten the Court into so much trouble 
in the fourth amendment cases. As Justice Brennan, dissenting in Elstad, pointed out: 
[T]he Court ... suggest[s] that, "[u]nfortunately," Miranda is such an inherently "slip-
pery," "murky," and "difficult" concept that the authorities in general, and the police officer 
conducting the interrogation in this case in particular, cannot be faulted for failing to advise 
a suspect of his rights and to obtain an informed waiver. • • • Miranda will become 
"murky," however, only because the Court's opinion today threatens to become a self-fulfil-
ling prophecy. Although borderline cases occasionally have arisen respecting the concepts 
of "custody" and "interrogation," until today there has been nothing "slippery," "murky," 
or "difficult" about Miranda in the overwhelming majority of cases. The whole point of the 
Court's work in this area has been to prescribe "bright line" rules to give clear guidance to 
the authorities. 
105 S. Ct. at 1319-20 (citations omitted). 
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Will it work? Consider first the exceptions to the current warrant 
requirement discussed earlier. Unless Model II can eliminate many of 
these exceptions, the light it provides will not be worth the candle. 
But it will readily be seen that it can. Searches incident to arrest, for 
example, can be eliminated as an exception to the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements. All arrests must necessarily entail a frisk for 
weapons which does not depend on probable cause and therefore can-
not be subject to a warrant requirement. However, searches of the 
"area with4t the immediate control"115 of the suspect should only be 
performed after probable cause has been called in to the magistrate. 
(If there is no probable cause why should an arrest justify such a 
search?)116 Similarly, the automobile exception can be scrapped. 
When a car is stopped on the highway and the occupants arrested, as 
in Chambers v. Maroney, 117 there is no reason not to call for judicial 
approval before searching the car. Even if the occupants have not 
been arrested, the normal case will not present an emergency of such 
immediacy that calling for judicial authorization is precluded. Fi-
nally, many warrantless searches currently justified under the "exigent 
circumstances" exception need no longer be performed without a war-
rant since circumstances so "exigent" as to prevent the police from 
radioing for a warrant will rarely occur. For example, in Warden v. 
Hayden, 118 the classic exigent circumstances case, once the police had 
chased Hayden into his house they could have surrounded the house 
and stopped for the five minutes or less that it would have required to 
describe the situation to the magistrate over the radio and receive his 
authorization before entering. 
This almost universal warrant requirement would benefit both the 
police and the citizenry. If the police can receive prompt judicial in-
put into the propriety of their proposed conduct, they can normally 
115. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The area which may be searched inci-
dent to arrest is broad. In the automobile context, it includes the entire passenger compartment 
that the suspect occupied before the arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In the 
home context, many courts have concluded that it includes the entire room in which the suspect 
was arrested. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 47 Ill. 2d 402, 266 N.E.2d 330 (1971). 
116. What of a search for evidence on the person of the suspect which goes beyond a Terry 
frisk, as in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)? While it is true, as Professor LaFave 
points out, W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 5.2, at 266-67, that the Court has always recognized 
that such a search is appropriate, there is really no need to allow it. The police can protect 
themselves with a frisk. If the suspect is to be placed in custody, bis pockets can be emptied in a 
pre-custody (non-probable-cause and therefore warrantless) search. But if, as in Robinson, be is 
not to be jailed, then the clear rule of Model II can and should apply: no search without a 
warrant. As Justice Frankfurter argued in Rabinowitz, "it makes a mockery of the Fourth 
Amendment to sanction search without a search warrant merely because of the legality of an 
arrest." 339 U.S. at 70-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
117. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
118. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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avoid later suppression of evidence at trial (especially under the new, 
more lenient treatment of errors in warrant cases recently announced 
in United States v. Leon 119). In cases where the magistrate disapproves 
the proposed search due to lack of probable cause the police may be 
able to bolster their "affidavit" with additional investigation, thus 
avoiding later suppression due to an error that could have been cor-
rected in advance. The citizen, of course, will benefit from the fact 
that, in virtually all cases, the judgment of a "neutral and detached 
magistrate" will be interjected into the search process. Moreover, the 
police will be forced to commit themselves, in advance, as to what 
evidence they have to support the search, thus avoiding the possibility 
of the search being justified post facto by evidence that is found in the 
search itself. 
Such an exercise may seem unduly restrictive of effective police 
work. Since it goes against police nature to cease pursuit of a suspect 
to observe the niceties of criminal procedure, it will undoubtedly mean 
that, at first, Model II will lead to more, not less, exclusion of evi-
dence. However, once the police realize that warrant use will be re-
warded and that warrantless searches will be penalized by automatic 
exclusion of evidence, they will quickly learn to adhere to the Model II 
requirements. 
Certainly there was a time when one could have reasonably argued 
that to deny the authorities the use of thumb screws and, later, rubber 
hoses went so much against "police nature" that it was futile to try to 
forbid such practices.120 Yet today the police seem to get along well 
enough without these aids and have even gotten used to informing 
suspects of their legal rights before questioning. They could similarly 
get used to obtaining magisterial authorization before searching, so 
long as the process did not substantially interfere with their ability to 
do a good job. This warrant requirement, with its emergency excep-
tion, is designed to be quick enough not to interfere with legitimate 
police activities, yet demanding enough to check abuses of the rights of 
119. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). But see Bradley, supra note 8, for a more detailed discussion of 
the problems that Leon's extreme deference to the magistrate's decision may cause. 
120. In 1931, Zechariah Chafee, the coauthor of the Wickersham Report on lawlessness in 
law enforcement, averred that bad as the third degree is, we should be very cautious about dis-
rupting the police department and the courts in the hope of abolishing it. Chafee, Remedies for 
the Third Degree; ATL. MONTHLY, Nov. 1931, at 621, 625-26, 630, cited in Y. KAMISAR, supra 
note 106, at 63-64. 
In the early twenties, after 
a state court excluded a defendant's confession because it had been obtained through use of 
the third degree, a Chicago police official announced that 95% of the department's work 
would be rendered useless if the decision were allowed to stand. "We are permitted to do 
less every day," the chief complained. "Pretty soon there won't be a police department." 
C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 172 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
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the citizenry. Indeed, such a system might prove very attractive to 
police. Unlike the Miranda warnings, which tend, however ineffec-
tively, to interfere with what the police are trying to do (get confes-
sions from suspects), a warrant requirement is a neutral higher 
authorization that should make a functionary in a hierarchical police 
organization comfortable. If the magistrate authorizes the search, the 
policeman cannot be criticized for conducting it. If the magistrate re-
fuses the search, the policeman cannot be criticized for not searching. 
Much of the uncertainty that currently plagues police would thus be 
eliminated. 
If such a readily enforceable warrant requirement were adopted, 
the Court might be tempted to expand the fourth amendment's cover-
age. As discussed, a search of an "open field" frequently intrudes on 
areas in which people have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet 
the Court has excluded open field searches from the coverage of the 
fourth amendment, presumably to reduce the burdens that would be 
placed on law enforcement by a contrary holding. Since it would be a 
simple matter for police to radio for a warrant before searching open 
fields, the Court could feel more free to restore "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" as the test of fourth amendment protected interests 
and require warrants for all searches of "fields" which bear indications 
that they are private property from which the public is excluded. 
Model II is necessarily limited to "probable cause" searches be-
cause searches that are not based on probable cause could not be sub-
ject to a warrant requirement unless the Constitution, which requires 
that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,"121 were 
amended.122 Thus, border searches, driver's license checks, and car 
inventory searches, which are not based on probable cause, and which 
principally serve other societal interests than the discovery of the evi-
dence of crime, must necessarily remain free of any warrant require-
ment. Similarly, stop and frisk encounters on the street, which are 
based not on probable cause but upon a reasonable suspicion that a 
suspect is "armed and dangerous,"123 must be excepted both because a 
probable cause warrant could not issue under the current standards 
for stop and frisk and because the "armed and dangerous" require-
ment implies an emergency such that the policeman would not have 
time to radio for authorization before dealing with such a suspect. 
121. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
122. The Supreme Court, with its endorsement of administrative warrants issued upon "area 
probable cause" in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), did, in effect, amend the 
Constitution for a limited class of cases. 
123. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
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Model II revitalizes the proposition of Justice Frankfurter in his 
dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz124 that "a search is 'unreasona-
ble' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by 
absolute necessity. " 125 Despite the Court's claim to having adopted 
Frankfurter's view, the current automobile and search incident to 
arrest exceptions go far beyond what anyone could reasonably con-
sider to be "absolute necessity." Since an automobile sometimes 
presents the police with a situation where there is not time to get a 
warrant, the Court has declared that automobiles always may be 
searched without warrants. Far more sensible is a rule that 
automobiles, houses, stores, garages, and fields may never be searched 
without a warrant unless absolutely necessary. In most cases it will be 
possible to discern easily enough whether the police were correct in 
their assertion that absolute necessity prevented the procurement of a 
warrant. In cases in which it is not clear, at least the debate will be 
focused on the correct issue - whether there really was an emergency 
- rather than, as is currently the case, on whether a recreational vehi-
cle is an "automobile" or whether the glove compartment or the back 
seat of a car in which a person was arrested is an "area within his 
immediate control." 
As with any clear rule, examples of cases in which Model II would 
not yield satisfactory results, or where its operation seems unclear, can 
be readily imagined. What if the magistrate is unavailable when the 
police call in? Can an "emergency" be created by the failure of the 
police to call for a warrant at the earliest possible moment? Should 
the standards for an acceptable warrant affidavit be loosened in recog-
nition of the difficulty of making a coherent and comprehensive pres-
entation over the radio, possibly in the presence of the suspect who is 
to be searched?126 Moreover, while Model II is as stringent and effec-
tive a warrant requirement as one can reasonably imagine, recognition 
of the practical difficulties of police work demands that that require-
ment contain significant exceptions (the "emergency" and "non-prob-
able-cause search" exceptions), with concomitant litigation over 
whether one of those exceptions applies in a given case. Still, by limit-
ing the number of exceptions and, hopefully, creating a rule which will 
not require further exceptions, Model II represents a distinct improve-
ment over the current system. Finally, if police get used to calling for 
124. 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (case later overruled by Chime! v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
125. 339 U.S. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
126. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), by providing a reasonableness standard 
for testing the admissability of evidence seized pursuant to defective warrants, would prove most 
helpful in resolving disputes arising out of problems with Model II warrants. 
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warrants, then they may do so in doubtful situations so that close 
cases will rarely arise. 
IV. THE MODELS AT WORK 
The test of any proposal is whether it can resolve real cases better 
than they are currently being resolved. An acid test is provided by the 
case of New York v. Belton, 127 where the Court found itself confronted 
with the task of integrating two of its confusing doctrines, the automo-
bile exception (to the warrant but not the probable cause requirement) 
and the search incident to arrest exception (to both) into a single deci-
sion. In Belton, a highway patrolman stopped a speeding car, smelled 
marijuana, and saw an envelope on the floor marked "Supergold" 
which he associated with marijuana. He then ordered the four occu-
pants out of the car, informed them that they were under arrest, and 
searched the passenger compartment of the car, finding marijuana in 
the envelope and cocaine in the zippered pocket of a black leather 
jacket. 
The Court upheld the search, citing the need for "a set of rules 
which, in most instances, makes it possible [for the police] to reach a 
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy 
is justified."128 Accordingly, the five-to-four majority held that the 
passenger compartment of an automobile may always be searched "in-
cident to arrest" of the occupants (i.e., without a warrant or probable 
cause to search) because that compartment is "generally, even if not 
inevitably," an "area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."129 
Thus Belton, like Ross, 130 tried to make things easier for the police 
by establishing a "bright line" that was applicable in a limited class of 
cases (arrests from automobiles). Such an effort is doomed to failure 
because the class of cases in which the "bright line" is to apply does 
not itself have clear boundaries. As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, 
the new rule 
leaves open too many questions and, more important, it provides the 
police and the courts with too few tools with which to find the answers. 
Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search of a 
car may take place even though the suspect was arrested outside the car, 
it does not indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that search may 
validly be conducted. Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be 
127. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
128. 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, supra note 78, at 142). 
129. 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
130. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
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valid if conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty min-
utes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in 
close proximity to the car when the search is conducted? . . . [W]hat is 
meant by "interior"? Does it include locked glove compartments, the 
interior of door panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special 
rules necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage 
compartment may be reached through the interior, or taxicabs, where a 
glass panel might separate the driver's compartment from the rest of the 
car? Are the only containers that may be searched those that are large 
enough to be "capable of holding another object"? Or does the new rule 
apply to any container, even if it "could hold neither a weapon nor evi-
dence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested"? . . . 
The Court does not give the police any "bright-line" answers to these 
questions. More important, because the Court's new rule abandons the 
justification underlying Chimel it offers no guidance to the police officer 
seeking to work out these answers for himself. 131 
Beyond leaving unanswered questions, the result in Belton, as in 
Ross132 and Oliver, 133 will lead to unjust results in many cases. While 
the Court continues to assert that one has a constitutional right not to 
have his automobile searched without both a warrant and probable 
cause unless there is some good reason for doing so, Belton converts 
the fact that there may be a good reason to permit such warrantless, 
non-probable-cause searches in some cases into a rule permitting such 
searches in all cases.134 The "clear rule" of Belton is neither clear nor 
just. 
By contrast, either of the two models suggested here can resolve 
the Belton issues easily and, more importantly, without creating a pre-
cedent that will cause mischief in the future. Under Model II the reso-
lution is simple. There is nothing to indicate that the patrolman had 
any sense of emergency in the case. He could have radioed his evi-
dence (which clearly constituted probable cause) to the magistrate at 
his convenience (presumably after help had arrived), obtained an au-
thorization, and searched the car. (Of course, the original, non-prob-
able-cause traffic stop would not require a Model II warrant, nor 
would the non-probable-cause plain view of the "Supergold" envel-
ope.) If Model II were in effect, it could readily have been complied 
with in this case, and the extensive litigation that Belton engendered 
would have been avoided. Of course, if Model II were not complied 
with, the evidence would have to be suppressed. In a case in which 
131. 453 U.S. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
132. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
133. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). 
134. For a detailed criticism of Belton see LaFave, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 208-14 (Supp. 
1985). 
1500 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1468 
there is probable cause to arrest the occupant of a car but not to search 
it (e.g., a suspect is arrested on a fugitive warrant), under Model II 
police would not, and should not, be able to search the car just because 
they could not get a warrant (Belton allowed such a search).135 It is 
difficult to imagine an automobile case where an emergency would jus-
tify dispensing with a Model II warrant. 
The application of Model I to this case is less clear cut but still not 
difficult. Here the patrolman had evidence amounting to a virtual cer-
tainty that marijuana was present in the car. Moreover, he was deal-
ing with a car and not a house. On the other hand, the suspected 
offense was a minor one and there was no emergency. One could re-
solve this case either way, and, since the resolution would have little 
precedential value, it is not terribly important what that resolution 
might be. In my view the stronger argument is that the intrusion on 
protected interests was sufficiently slight and the probable cause so 
strong that the policeman acted reasonably. If he had proceeded to 
demand the keys to the trunk and to go through suitcases found 
therein, I would conclude that he should have obtained a warrant 
before doing so.136 Had he opened a locked container in the passenger 
compartment, judges undoubtedly would split as to whether this was 
"reasonable" or not. 137 When the goal of providing definitive answers 
in advance is demonstrably unachievable, tolerance for uncertainty is 
the only alternative. A system which tolerates uncertainty only in rel-
atively close cases is far preferable to a system in which, as in Belton, 
clear rules dictate unjust results. At least if the evidence is suppressed 
under Model I, it will be suppressed on the basis of the bottom line of 
the fourth amendment - that the search was unreasonable - and not 
because a court determines that a locked container is not part of the 
passenger compartment of the car. This latter question, which Belton 
forces the courts to ask, is an irrelevant abstraction that completely 
loses track of the fundamental fourth amendment requirement of 
"reasonableness." 
CONCLUSION 
Fourth amendment law, to be effective in limiting inappropriate 
135. Of course, a mistake by the magistrate in his assessment of probable cause would be 
subject to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule recently announced in United States 
v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
136. Of course, the adoption of Model I would not preclude the use of Model II (radioed, 
tape-recorded) warrants. Ross currently seems to allow such a warrantless search. See text at 
notes 56-58 supra. 
137. This assumes they would ignore the Belton holding itself, which allowed a search of 
"any containers found within the passenger compartment." Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
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police behavior while at the same time allowing for effective law en-
forcement, must be a coherent and relatively simple doctrine that a 
policeman can readily understand and apply. No one could seriously 
argue that the current law even remotely approaches this ideal. On 
the contrary, it is so full of fictitious rules and multifaceted exceptions 
(and exceptions to those exceptions) that the most that could be said 
of anyone's grasp of the doctrine is that "he sees where most of the 
problems are." The two models suggested in this Article can each be 
summed up in a single terse command that every policeman can un-
derstand: "Act reasonably!" or "Get a warrant whenever you can!" 
Model I may seem a shocking and unacceptable solution to civil liber-
tarians; Model II, to law and order advocates. But both groups, as 
well as those in between, would agree that strong solutions are neces-
sary if a workable doctrine is to be developed. The Court's efforts to 
tread a tightrope between two extremes has resulted in a morass of 
confusion that can satisfy nobody. In discussing these models I have 
endeavored to show that they are neutral proposals which will have 
some benefits for law enforcement, for defendants, and for public per-
ception of the exclusionary process, which is currently regarded as er-
ratic and irrational. If the Court does not embrace one of these 
solutions, it is destined to sink ever deeper into the mire of contradic-
tion and confusion. 
